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Four	  years	  after	  the	  ‘credit	  crunch’	  burst	  into	  the	  consciousness	  of	  mainstream	  political	  actors,	  the	  Global	  
Financial	   Crisis	   (GFC)	   remains	   the	   foremost	   point	   of	   reference	   around	   which	   policymakers	   across	   the	  
advanced	  industrialized	  world	  continue	  to	  orient	  their	  activities.	  Given	  the	  regulatory	  shortcomings	  brought	  
to	   the	  surface	  by	   the	  crisis,i	  debates	  over	   ’big	  picture’	  policy	   reforms	  have	  been	  at	   the	   forefront	  of	  post-­‐
crisis	   analyses.	  Opinion	   remains	  divided	  over	   the	  ongoing	  attempts	   to	   reform	  global	   financial	   regulation;	  
while	  some	  analysts	  suggest	  that	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  regulatory	  reform	  process	  has	  proceeded	  quite	  slowly	  and	  
by	  way	  of	  incremental	  adjustments,	  others	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  basis	  is	  being	  laid	  for	  substantive	  change	  
(cf.	  Moschella	  and	  Tsingou	  2013;	  Broome	  et	  al	  2012;	  Ferran	  et	  al	  2012).	  Given	  the	  continuing	  efforts	  to	  re-­‐
draw	   domestic	   and	   international	   regulatory	   frameworks	   across	   the	   fields	   of	   banking,	   insurance,	   and	  
securities	  trading,	  these	  important	  debates	  are	  destined	  to	  roll	  on	  for	  some	  time.	  But	  below	  this	  first-­‐order	  
uncertainty,	  it	  is	  already	  possible	  to	  discern	  significant	  trends	  in	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  pattern	  of	  regulation.	  Here,	  
we	  focus	  on	  the	  current	  moves	  to	  bolster	  the	  capacity	  of	  international	  organisations	  to	  monitor	  and	  ‘make	  
sense	  of’	  global	  financial	  linkages	  through	  the	  Data	  Gaps	  Initiative	  (DGI).	  	  
The	  DGI	  was	  launched	  by	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF)	  and	  Financial	  Stability	  Board	  (FSB)	  
in	  2009,	  and	  constitutes	  the	  first	  major	  post-­‐Crisis	  attempt	  to	  enhance	  global	  data-­‐collection	  capability.	  For	  
any	  large	  bureaucratic	  organisation,	  effectively	  managing	  information	  so	  that	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  social	  
world	   is	  mediated	   into	   a	   series	   of	   analytically	   tractable	   issues	   is	   a	   key	   pillar	   of	   operational	   success.	   For	  
international	  organizations	  (IOs),	  which	  are	  often	  presented	  with	  ill-­‐defined	  goals	  in	  relation	  to	  issues	  that	  
(by	   definition)	   involve	   multi-­‐level	   interactions,	   both	   the	   importance	   and	   difficulty	   of	   this	   process	   is	  
significantly	   enhanced.	   And	   for	   IOs	   involved	   in	   global	   financial	   regulation,	   faced	  with	   an	   object	   that	   has	  
historically	   remained	   in	   the	   shadows	   but	   whose	   capacity	   to	   ferment	   instability	   was	   all	   too	   plainly	  
demonstrated	   through	  2007-­‐08,	   functioning	  as	  effective	  managers	  of	   information	   is	  a	  goal	  of	   the	  utmost	  
importance.	  The	  Data	  Gaps	  Initiative	  represents	  an	  ambitious	  attempt	  to	  extend	  IMF	  surveillance	  to	  cover	  
private	  financial	  flows	  and	  a	  range	  of	   indicators	  of	  financial	  sector	  stability.	  While	  the	  basis	  for	  significant	  
improvements	  in	  data-­‐gathering	  are	  being	  laid	  through	  the	  Initiative,	  the	  relative	  lack	  of	  focus	  on	  analytic	  
capacity	  remains	  a	  significant	  weakness.	  	  Owing	  to	  this	  balance	  of	  successes	  and	  shortcomings,	  we	  suggest	  
that	  at	  present	  the	  DGI	  represents	  a	  ‘job	  half	  done’.	  The	  DGI	  framework	  was	  approved	  jointly	  by	  the	  IMF	  
and	  FSB;	  however,	  as	  the	  Fund	  has	  primary	  responsibility	  for	  translating	  its	  agenda	  into	  operational	  reality,	  
the	  chapter	  focuses	  in	  the	  main	  on	  this	  institution.	  
In	   presenting	   our	   analysis,	   the	   chapter	   develops	   through	   the	   following	   structure.	   In	   the	   second	  
section	  we	  present	  a	  brief	  review	  of	  the	  existing	  literature	  on	  data	  collection	  in	  global	  governance,	  which	  
provides	  useful	  conceptual	  guidance	  around	  which	  we	  frame	  our	  analysis.	   In	  the	  third	  section	  we	  outline	  
the	  context	  in	  which	  the	  DGI	  emerged.	  The	  roots	  of	  the	  Fund’s	  role	  as	  a	  data-­‐collection	  hub	  run	  deep	  into	  
the	  organisation’s	  history,	  and	  we	  see	  in	  recent	  decades	  that	  financial	  crises	  have	  been	  followed	  by	  ‘data	  
rushes’	  within	  the	  institution.	  We	  then	  in	  the	  fourth	  section	  review	  the	  main	  features	  of	  the	  DGI,	  and	  also	  
evaluate	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	   IMF	   to	   maximise	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   Initiative.	   While	   significant	  
achievements	   have	   been	   made,	   limitations	   of	   analytic	   capacity	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   spillover	   effects	   of	  
financial	   sector	   disruptions	   continue	   to	   limit	   the	   prospects	   for	   the	   DGI.	   In	   the	   concluding	   section,	   we	  
summarize	  the	  main	  findings	  and	  review	  the	  wider	  implications	  that	  follow	  from	  our	  analysis	  in	  relation	  to	  
the	  themes	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Introduction	  to	  this	  volume.	  	  
In	  common	  with	  the	  conclusion	  reached	  by	  additional	  contributors	  to	  this	  volume	  in	  their	  analyses	  
of	  other	  areas	  of	  global	  financial	  regulation,	  we	  find	  that	  post-­‐Crisis	  reforms	  to	  data	  collection	  networks	  are	  
serving	  to	  increase	  the	  complexity	  of	  transnational	  governance	  structures.	  This	  dynamic	  is	  in	  significant	  part	  
driven	   by	   the	   prevalent	   belief	   that	   market	   stability	   is	   achievable	   through	   the	   timely	   provision	   of	  
comprehensive	  flows	  of	   information.	  With	  policymakers	  continuing	  to	  exhibit	  a	  preference	  for	  adaptation	  
(the	   making	   of	   minor	   modifications	   to	   existing	   practices	   and	   the	   layering	   of	   new	   tasks	   in	   to	   existing	  
programmes)	  in	  this	  area,	  the	  drive	  toward	  increasing	  complexity	  will	  remain	  the	  dominant	  pattern	  in	  post-­‐
Crisis	   reforms	   to	   financial	   sector	   surveillance.	   Indeed,	   it	   should	   be	   acknowledged	   that	   the	   dynamics	  
surrounding	   the	   Data	   Gaps	   Initiative	   examined	   in	   this	   chapter	   represent	   but	   one	   component	   of	   this	  
dynamic.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	   important	  differences	   in	  domestic	   regulatory	   frameworks	   continue	   to	   inform	  
competing	  surveillance	  practices;	  on	  the	  other,	  private	  actors	  will	  continue	  to	  rely	  on	  a	  wide	  arrange	  of	  fast	  
moving	  market	  and	  non-­‐market	  signals	  when	  taking	  decisions.	  The	  DGI	  represents	  an	  important	  post-­‐Crisis	  
attempt	  to	  bring	  order	  to	  this	  picture	  of	  complexity.	  
The	   dynamics	   explored	   through	   this	   chapter	   coalesce	   closely	   with	   the	   focus	   of	   Andrew	   Baker’s	  
contribution	   to	   this	   volume.	  Where	  Baker	   examines	   the	   intellectual	   underpinnings	  of	  what	  he	   terms	   the	  
Macroprudential	   Project,	   the	  Data	  Gaps	   Initiative	   is	   itself	   in	   part	   a	   product	   of	   the	   growing	   consensus	   in	  
global	  and	  national	  arenas	  that	  regulatory	  frameworks	  need	  to	  be	  extended	  beyond	  providing	  oversight	  of	  
individual	  financial	  institutions,	  to	  encompass	  a	  focus	  on	  smoothing	  out	  systemic	  tendencies	  towards	  rapid	  
growth	  and	  reversals.	  And	  in	  parallel	  to	  Baker’s	  finding	  that	  the	  rise	  of	  macroprudentialism	  on	  policymaking	  
agendas	   has	   been	   driven	   by	   technocratic	   expertise	   rather	   than	   overt	   political	   contestation,	   our	   analysis	  
demonstrates	  that	  relatively	  low-­‐key	  incrementalism	  has	  remained	  the	  order	  of	  the	  day	  in	  relation	  to	  data	  
collection.	   Given	   the	   lack	   of	   clarity	   regarding	   how	   to	   conceptualise	   or	   measure	   relevant	   systemic	  
tendencies,	   historically	   established	   trajectories	   residing	  within	   existing	  data-­‐collection	  networks	   continue	  
to	  determine	  patterns	  of	  evolution	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  
	  
2.	  Data	  in	  the	  World	  of	  International	  Organisations	  	  
Information	  matters	  in	  the	  world	  of	  international	  organizations	  (IOs),	  and	  it	  is	  now	  widely	  agreed	  that	  a	  key	  
driver	   of	   member	   states’	   decisions	   to	   delegate	   functions	   to	   an	   IO	   is	   the	   prospect	   of	   gaining	   additional	  
information	   on	   a	   given	   policy	   issue	   at	   a	   low	   marginal	   cost.	   And	   while	   the	   existing	   literature	   remains	  
somewhat	   disjointed,	  when	   viewed	   holistically	   it	   can	   be	   seen	   that	   this	   core	   activity	   is	   comprised	   of	   two	  
closely	   linked	  components.	   In	  order	  to	  maximise	  their	  success,	   IOs	  must	  accomplish	  two	  tasks:	  they	  must	  
institute	   effective	   data	   collection	   networks;	   and	   they	   must	   develop	   their	   analytic	   capacity	   so	   that	  
meaningful	  interpretations	  of	  the	  resulting	  data	  can	  be	  provided,	  and	  decisions	  over	  necessary	  reforms	  to	  
the	  data-­‐collection	  network	  be	  effectively	  taken.	  The	  difficulties	  associated	  with	  the	  effective	  achievement	  
of	  either	  of	  these	  technocratic	  and	  analytic	  components	  should	  not	  be	  underestimated,	  but	  in	  the	  field	  of	  
global	  financial	  supervision	  it	  is	  vital	  that	  significant	  advances	  are	  achieved	  along	  both	  pathways	  in	  as	  short	  
a	  timescale	  as	  is	  possible.	  
	   A	  range	  of	  studies	  have	  suggested	  that,	   in	  making	  the	  decision	  to	  sign-­‐up	  to	  participate	   in	   formal	  
international	   organisations,	   the	   benefits	   flowing	   from	   the	   receipt	   of	   comprehensive,	   policy-­‐relevant	  
information	   from	  an	   IO’s	  highly	  specialised	  staff	   is	  a	  primary	   factor	  of	  consideration	   for	  state	  actors	   (e.g.	  
Abbott	  and	  Snidal	  1998	  ;	  Goldstein	  et	  al.	  2000	  ;	  Hawkins	  et	  al.	  2006	  ;	  Koremenos,	  Lipson,	  and	  Snidal	  2001).	  
In	  the	  words	  of	  Mark	  Pollack	  (2006,	  170):	  ‘the	  empirical	  world	  is	  inherently	  uncertain,	  and	  legislators	  face	  
constant	   demands	   for	   policy-­‐relevant	   information	   about	   the	   state	   of	   the	   world’.	   Given	   the	   high	   costs	  
associated	  with	   unilaterally	   establishing	   data-­‐collection	   networks	   with	   which	   to	   reduce	   uncertainty	   to	   a	  
manageable	   level,	   this	   feature	   of	   international	   politics	   creates	   an	   important	   role	   for	   international	  
organisations	  (Thompson	  2006,	  230).	  By	  maintaining	  regular	  communication	  with	  national	  health	  agencies	  
to	   provide	   early	   warning	   on	   the	   development	   of	   global	   pandemics,	   as	   is	   done	   by	   the	   World	   Health	  
Organisation,	  or	  providing	  privileged	  access	  to	  information	  on	  economic	  developments	  in	  member	  states,	  
as	   is	  done	  by	   the	   International	  Monetary	  Fund,	   IOs	  can	  provide	  substantial	  efficiency	  gains	   in	   relation	   to	  
data	  collection.	  	  
There	  are,	  however,	  at	  least	  three	  common	  challenges	  confronting	  IOs	  in	  their	  efforts	  to	  establish	  
efficient	  data-­‐collection	  networks.	  First,	   low	  data-­‐collection	  capabilities	  on	  the	  part	  of	  national	  authorities	  
can	  significantly	  inhibit	  IOs’	  abilities	  to	  collate	  standardised	  data	  across	  multiple	  national	  spaces.	  This	  issue	  
is	   particularly	   prevalent	   in	   developing	   countries	   (Denk	   and	   Weber	   2011,	   3),	   and	   indeed	   building	   the	  
statistical	  capacity	  of	  domestic	  agencies	  is	  now	  seen	  as	  a	  central	  pillar	  in	  achieving	  sustainable	  development	  
(UN	   2002).	   And	   while	   advanced	   industrialised	   states	   have	   more	   robust	   systems	   in	   place,	   limitations	   of	  
institutional	   capacity	   can	   still	   serve	   to	   frustrate	   the	   efforts	   of	   policymakers	   and	   leading	   officials	   to	  
implement	   purposive	   change	   (Vanoli	   2005).	   Second,	   member	   states	   can	   be	   reluctant	   to	   release	   certain	  
types	   of	   data	   to	   international	   organisations.	   This	   reluctance	   appears	   most	   commonly	   when	   issues	   of	  
national	   security	   are	   perceived	   to	   be	   at	   stake	   (Gupta	   et	   al	   2000),	   but	   many	   governments	   have	   also	  
displayed	  a	  strong	  propensity	  towards	  keeping	  data	  relating	  to	  particular	  aspects	  economic	  performance	  in	  
the	  shadows	  (Martin	  2006).	  Third,	  in	  situations	  where	  competing	  national	  templates	  for	  managing	  a	  policy	  
problem	   have	   developed,	   international	   institutions	   can	   struggle	   to	   encourage	   members	   to	   collate	  
internationally-­‐comparable	   data.	   While,	   for	   example,	   governments	   of	   advanced-­‐and	   emerging-­‐market	  
economies	   routinely	   collate	   ‘unemployment’	   figures,	   the	   lack	  of	   a	   commonly-­‐hold	  definition	   renders	   the	  
analysis	  of	  global	   trends	  a	  problematic	  exercise	  (World	  Bank	  2012).	  Given	  the	  close	  relationship	  between	  
data	  collection	  processes	  and	  national	  regulatory	  frameworks,	  this	  source	  of	  conflict	  can	  prove	  to	  be	  very	  
difficult	  to	  resolve	  (Sunder	  2002).	  As	  is	  demonstrated	  below,	  each	  of	  these	  issues	  is	  apposite	  to	  the	  case	  of	  
the	   IMF-­‐FSB	  Data	   Gaps	   Initiative.	   And	   although	   these	   intersections	   between	   IOs	   and	   data	   collection	   are	  
significant	   and	   a	   valuable	   focus	   of	   analysis,	   an	   additional	   dimension	   exists	   that	   it	   is	   also	   important	   to	  
explore.	  	  
Following	   the	   seminal	   contribution	   of	   Barnett	   and	   Finnemore	   (2004),	   a	   line	   of	   scholarship	   has	  
emerged	   that	   aims	   to	   explore	   the	   processes	   through	   which	   the	   ‘intellectual	   lives’	   of	   international	  
organisations	   shape	   global	   politics.	  Within	   this	   literature	   a	   particular	   focus	   is	   placed	   on	   the	  mechanisms	  
through	   which	   IOs	   use	   their	   positions	   of	   authority	   to	   establish	   operational	   templates	   that	   become	   the	  
‘common	  sense’	  understanding	  of	  a	  given	  issue	  (e.g.	  Broome	  and	  Seabrooke	  2012;	  Clegg	  2010;	  Moschella	  
2012).	  Through	  a	  combination	  of	   formal	  guidelines	   setting	  out	   the	   range	  of	  permissible	  action	   in	  a	  given	  
field,	  and	  more	  informally-­‐held	  understandings	  of	  what	  constitutes	  the	  most	  effective	  means	  of	  achieving	  
policy	  ends,	  arenas	  of	  global	  economic	  governance	  exert	  a	  subtle	  yet	  potent	   form	  of	   influence.	  Owing	  to	  
the	   complexity	  of	   the	   institutional	   structures	   involved,	   these	   ideational	   frameworks	   tend	   to	  evolve	   in	   an	  
incremental	  fashion	  (cf.	  Clegg	  2012a;	  Clegg	  2012b	  ;	  Moschella	  2012;	  Vetterlein	  2007	  ;	  Nielson,	  Tierney,	  and	  
Weaver	  2006).	  In	  the	  realm	  of	  financial	  surveillance,	  widely	  shared	  beliefs	  about	  the	  causes	  of	  crises	  can	  be	  
also	  seen	  to	  contribute	  to	  this	  tendency.	  
Within	  the	  dominant	  paradigm	  of	  global	  economic	  management,	  instability	  in	  financial	  markets	  has	  
in	   recent	   decades	   been	   by	   and	   large	   treated	   as	   a	   result	   of	   ‘uncertainty’	   (Best	   2004).	   Indeed,	   Chwieroth	  
(2010)	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  rise	  to	  dominance	  of	  the	  ‘neoliberal’	  paradigm	  amongst	   IMF	  staff	  from	  
the	   1980s	   served	   to	   embed	   the	   view	   that,	   owing	   to	   actors’	   assumed	   capacity	   to	   process	   information	  
efficiently,	   the	   provision	   of	   timely	   and	   accurate	   information	   would	   enhance	   stability.	   According	   to	   this	  
worldview,	   as	   information	   shortages	   rather	   than	   the	   inherent	   tendencies	   of	   internationalised	   financial	  
markets	  were	  the	  primary	  drivers	  of	   instability,	  more	  information	  rather	  than	  tighter	  regulation	  comes	  to	  
be	   seen	   as	   the	   antidote	   to	   periods	   of	   disruption.	   These	   beliefs	   serve	   to	   establish	   a	   tendency	   toward	   a	  
particular	  type	  of	  operational	  change	  in	  the	  field	  of	  financial	  sector	  supervision,	  which	  can	  be	  elucidated	  by	  
drawing	  on	  the	  insights	  of	  Ernst	  and	  Peter	  Haas.	  	  
For	  Haas	  and	  Haas	  (1995:	  259-­‐63),	  processes	  of	  change	  can	  be	  characterised	  as	  being	  underpinned	  
by	   either	   institutional	   ‘learning’	   or	   ‘adaptation’.	   Learning	   occurs	   when	   actors	   respond	   to	   a	   crisis	   by	  
fundamentally	   re-­‐examining	   underlying	   beliefs	   about	   relationships	   between	   means	   and	   ends	   in	   policy	  
programmes.	  Adaptation,	  the	  more	  common	  form	  of	  response,	  entails	  layering	  in	  relatively	  minor	  changes	  
into	  bureaucratic	  routines.	  The	  recurrence	  of	  post-­‐crisis	  data	  rushes	  at	  the	  IMF	  suggests	  that	  processes	  of	  
global	  financial	  governance	  retain	  their	  hard-­‐wired	  tendency	  toward	  adaptation.	  The	  Data	  Gaps	  Initiative	  is	  
no	   exception.	   While	   the	   swift	   re-­‐configuration	   of	   the	   data-­‐collection	   networks	   through	   which	   global	  
financial	   surveillance	   is	   exercised	   has	   been	   impressive,	   the	   impact	   of	   these	   developments	   will	   remain	  
limited	  by	  these	  foundational	  issues.	  
With	  their	  broad	  membership	  bases	  and	  established	  mechanisms	  for	  communicating	  with	  national	  
agencies,	  international	  organisations	  are	  uniquely	  well	  placed	  to	  establish	  data-­‐collection	  networks	  capable	  
of	  generating	  comprehensive	  and	  comparable	  indicators	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  given	  global	  policy	  issue.	  However,	  
rather	   than	  providing	  a	  neutral	   ‘snapshot’	  of	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  reality,	   these	  networks	  reflect	   the	   intellectual	  
assumptions	  held	  by	  their	  founders.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  DGI,	  we	  see	  that	  the	  response	  to	  financial	  crisis	  by	  
policymaking	   elites	   remains	   predicated	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	  more	   information	  will	   lead	   to	   smoother	  
market	   adjustments.	   This	   proclivity	   for	   making	   incremental	   adjustment	   rather	   than	   engaging	   in	   deeper	  
learning	   exercises	   reflects	   dominant	   neoliberal	   beliefs	   that	   the	   major	   cause	   of	   irrational	   behaviour	   is	  
information	  shortage	  (see	  also	  Baker	  in	  this	  volume).	  While	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  incremental	  adjustments	  
made	  should	  not	  be	  underplayed,	  this	  tendency	  toward	  adaptation	  provides	  a	  root	  cause	  of	  the	  increasing	  
complexity	   of	   structures	   of	   transnational	   financial	   governance.	   With	   attempts	   to	   expand	   the	   scale	   and	  
scope	  of	  data-­‐collection	  networks	  continuing	  to	  outpace	  the	  Fund’s	  institutional	  learning	  on	  financial	  sector	  
developments,	  this	  dynamic	  will	  continue	  to	  evolve	  over	  the	  medium	  term.	  
	  
3.	  The	  IMF	  and	  Financial	  Crises:	  Data	  to	  the	  Rescue	  
A	  central	   function	  of	   the	   IMF	   is	   to	  carry	  out	  surveillance	  at	   the	  country-­‐,	   regional-­‐,	  and	  systemic-­‐levels	   in	  
support	   of	   global	   financial	   stability.	   Over	   the	   course	   of	   its	   long	   history,	   the	   Fund	   has	   established	  
considerable	  data-­‐collection	  capabilities	  to	  facilitate	  its	  execution	  of	  these	  activities.	  After	  briefly	  reviewing	  
the	   evolution	   of	   the	   Fund’s	   role	   as	   data-­‐collection	   hub,	   we	   reflect	   on	   the	   interaction	   between	   these	  
activities	  and	  the	  periodic	  eruption	  of	  financial	  crises.	  By	  so	  doing,	  we	  contextualise	  the	  reforms	  that	  were	  
required	   by	   the	   IMF-­‐FSB	   Data	   Gaps	   Initiative.	   The	   recurrence	   of	   data	   rushes	   through	   the	   Fund’s	   history	  
demonstrates	   that	   the	   belief	   in	   the	   ability	   of	   predictable	   and	   comprehensive	   flows	   of	   data	   to	   smooth	  
adjustments	  in	  global	  financial	  markets	  is	  well	  established	  at	  the	  IMF.	  
The	   IMF’s	   Articles	   of	   Agreement	   are	   notably	   vague	   on	   the	   subject	   of	   information	   gathering.	   By	  
joining	   the	  organisation,	  member	   states	   agree	   to	   furnish	   the	  organisation	  with	   ‘such	   information	  as	   [the	  
Fund]	  deem	  necessary	   for	   the	  effective	  discharge	  of	   [its]	  duties’.	  The	  Articles	  contain	  an	   indicative	   list	  of	  
types	   of	   data	   that	  may	  be	   required	  by	   the	   Fund,	  which	   are	   primarily	   focused	  on	   the	  provision	  of	   timely	  
disclosures	   in	   relation	   to	   holdings	   of	   gold	   and	   foreign	   exchange,	   and	   aggregate	   measures	   of	   national	  
economic	   activity.	   However,	   with	   the	   expansion	   during	   its	   early	   decades	   of	   operation	   of	   the	   range	   of	  
factors	   that	   were	   seen	   by	   Fund	   staffs	   as	   contributing	   to	   balance	   of	   payments	   crises,	   there	   was	   a	  
corresponding	  increase	  in	  the	  range	  of	  data	  requested	  from	  member	  states.	  In	  particular,	  the	  growing	  focus	  
on	  patterns	  of	   government	   income	  and	  expenditure	   through	   the	  1970s	   and	  1980s	   served	   to	  expand	   the	  
volume	   of	   data	   that	   Mission	   Teams	   and	   Desk	   Economists	   routinely	   requested	   from	   country	   authorities	  
continued	  to	  expand	  significantly	  through	  this	  period.	  
	   During	  this	   time,	   the	   IMF	  remained	  something	  of	  a	  passive	  recipient	  of	   information	   from	  country	  
authorities.	   In	   what	   at	   the	   time	   was	   a	   relatively	   de-­‐centralised	   organisation,	   staff	   from	   different	   Area	  
Departments	   followed	   a	   range	   of	   metadata	   protocols	   (lists	   and	   definitions	   of	   core	   indicators)	   when	  
collecting	   information	   from	   Finance	   Ministries	   and	   Central	   Banks.	   Indeed,	   even	   within	   the	   same	   Area	  
Department	   staffs’	   attentive	   focus	   to	   the	   particularities	   of	   a	   given	   country	   meant	   that	   the	   creation	   of	  
readily	   comparable	   data	   tables	   was	   rarely	   a	   straightforward	   task	   (IMF	   1982b:	   1).	   Internal	   staff	  
communications	  provide	  a	  window	  into	  the	  situation	  as	  it	  existed	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  with	  a	  memorandum	  
sent	   from	   the	   Chief	   of	   the	   FAD	   Government	   Expenditure	   and	   Analysis	   Division	   to	   the	   FAD	   Director	  
communicating	  obvious	  frustration	  over	  this	  state	  of	  affairs:	  
It	  has	  always	  seemed	  to	  me…	  extraordinary	  that	  area	  departments	  do	  not	  produce	  at	  least	  some	  of	  
their	  country	  tables	  on	  a	  strictly	  intercountry	  comparable	  basis.	  I	  realise,	  of	  course,	  it	  is	  easier	  not	  
to,	  but	  for	  an	  international	  institution	  such	  as	  the	  Fund	  comparability…	  is	  –	  or	  ought	  to	  be	  –	  one	  of	  
our	  major	  strengths	  (IMF	  1982a:	  1).	  
	  
Inter-­‐departmental	  politics	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  repositioning	  the	  IMF	  as	  a	  more	  proactive	  shaper	  of	  
data-­‐collection	   networks.	   Through	   the	   early	   1980s	   the	   support	   of	   Jacques	   de	   Larosière,	   the	   then	   IMF	  
Managing	   Director,	   for	   moves	   to	   routinely	   generate	   comparable	   data	   tables	   significantly	   bolstered	  
Functional	  Departments’	  efforts	  to	  promote	  greater	  homogenisation.	  And	  in	  addition	  to	  these	  institutional	  
dynamics,	  a	  period	  of	  rapid	  technological	  change	  served	  to	  catalyse	  this	  transformation.	  
	   The	  arrival	  of	  desktop	  computers	  in	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  served	  to	  focus	  the	  minds	  of	  
senior	   figures	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   data	   collection	   and	   management.	   In	   1982	   de	   Larosière	   requested	   that	   a	  
working	   group	   be	   established	   to	   explore	   the	   practicalities	   involved	   in	   setting	   up	   a	   ‘readily	   accessible	  
computer-­‐based	   data	   system’,	   with	   the	   resolution	   of	   metadata	   inconsistencies	   appearing	   high	   on	   the	  
agenda	   of	   the	   resulting	   committee	   (IMF	   1982a:	   1,	   IMF	   1982b:	   1-­‐2).	   In	   the	   following	   years	   the	   working	  
group’s	   endeavours	   began	   to	   bear	   fruit,	  with	   the	   launch	   in	   1984	   of	   a	   Fund-­‐wide	   Catalogue	   of	   Economic	  
Time	  Series	  Data	  marking	  a	  particular	  moment	  of	  success.	  The	  Catalogue	  contained	  12	  chapters,	  covering	  
income	  and	  expenditure,	  production	  and	   labour	  markets,	   costs	  and	  prices,	  government	   finance,	   financial	  
variables,	   balance	   of	   payments	   summary,	   merchandise	   trade,	   invisibles,	   capital	   account	   liabilities,	  
international	  reserves,	  exchange	  rates,	  and	  foreign	  investment	  and	  debt.	  In	  total,	  these	  chapters	  called	  on	  
staff	  and	  country	  authorities	  to	  provide	  over	  1,000	  individual	  data	  entries.	  By	  aligning	  the	  Catalogue	  with	  its	  
Balance	   of	   Payments	   Manual	   and	   existing	   System	   of	   National	   Accounts	   guidelines,	   and	   introducing	   a	  
corresponding	  Manual	   on	   Government	   Financial	   Statistics	   in	   1986,	   the	   Fund	   entrenched	   its	   capacity	   to	  
define	   and	   re-­‐define	   key	   terms	   and	   data	   collection	   techniques.	   Through	   the	   course	   of	   the	   decade,	   by	  
creating	  a	  universal	  template	  for	  staff	  and	  country	  authorities	  to	  follow,	  the	  IMF	  was	  transformed	  from	  a	  
relatively	  reactive	  recipient	  of	  information	  to	  a	  proactive	  re-­‐fashioner	  of	  data-­‐collection	  networks.	  
The	   story	   of	   data	   collection	   at	   the	   IMF	   through	   the	   1990s	   was	   one	   of	   significant	   extension.	  
Throughout	  the	  decade,	  the	  Fund	  became	  increasingly	  proactive	  in	  pushing	  member	  states	  to	  both	  collect	  
and	  publish	  core	  macroeconomic	  and	  financial	  sector	  data.	  In	  addition,	  the	  organisation	  began	  to	  focus	  on	  
tracking	  the	  macroeconomic	  impact	  of	   international	  financial	   linkages	  (Gola	  and	  Spadafora	  2009).	   In	  part,	  
these	  shifts	  were	  driven	  by	  structural	  changes	  in	  the	  global	  economy;	  with	  the	  increasing	  liberalisation	  of	  
capital	  controls	  through	  the	  period,	  IMF	  practice	  was	  pushed	  to	  evolve	  in	  response	  to	  a	  changed	  reality.	  In	  
addition	  to	  these	  systemic	  dynamics,	  major	  financial	  crises	  in	  Mexico	  and	  across	  East	  Asia	  in	  the	  mid-­‐	  and	  
late-­‐1990s	   respectively	   served	   to	   spur	   these	   developments	   in	   the	   organisation’s	   surveillance	   capabilities	  
forward	  (Moschella	  2010).	  
The	  1994	  Mexican	  Crisis	  and	  1997	  Asian	  Financial	  Crisis	  injected	  a	  sense	  of	  urgency	  into	  the	  Fund’s	  
data-­‐collection	   expansion.	   For	   Fund	   staff	   and	   policymaking	   elites,	   each	   crisis	   offered	   a	   compelling	  
illustration	  of	  the	  potentially	  dramatic	  international	  spillover	  effects	  of	  weak	  domestic	  financial	  systems.	  In	  
the	  Mexican	  case,	  although	   the	  crisis	   started	  as	  a	   relatively	   contained	  macroeconomic	   crisis	   triggered	  by	  
growing	  budget	  deficits	  and	  rising	  inflation,	  the	  fragility	  of	  the	  domestic	  banking	  sector	  served	  to	  magnify	  
the	   extent	   of	   domestic	   disruption.	   Events	   took	   on	   a	   transnational	   dimension	  when	   investors	   reacted	   by	  
withdrawing	   firstly	   from	  Mexico,	  and	   then	   from	  a	   range	  of	  emerging-­‐market	  economies	  as	  a	  generalised	  
collapse	   in	  confidence	  took	  hold.	  Capital	  volatility	  and	  financial	  sector	  weakness	  also	  played	  a	  key	  role	   in	  
the	  Asian	  Financial	  Crisis.	  Countries	  that	  through	  the	  early-­‐	  and	  mid-­‐1990s	  had	  received	  the	  largest	  share	  of	  
capital	   inflows	   among	   developing	   economies	   experienced	   capital	   reversals	   of	   unprecedented	   scale.	   The	  
ensuing	   generalised	   contagion	   spread	   from	   East	   Asia	   to	   Russia	   and	   Brazil,	   with	   advanced-­‐industrialised	  
economies	  also	  experiencing	  a	  notable	  impact.ii	  Both	  the	  Mexican	  and	  Asian	  crises	  involved	  major	  lending	  
interventions	   from	   the	   IMF,	   and	   both	   sparked	   intense	   in-­‐house	   reflection	   on	   the	   organisation’s	  
operationalisation	  of	  its	  surveillance	  role.	  
	   Following	   its	   eruption,	   the	   IMF	  Executive	  Board	   commissioned	   IMF	  Counsellor	  Alan	  Whittome	   to	  
produce	  a	  report	   into	  the	   implications	  of	   the	  Mexican	  crisis	   for	   the	  organisation’s	  activities.	  Amongst	  the	  
Whittome	  Report’s	   recommendations,	   the	  Board	  approved	   the	   suggestion	   that	   surveillance	  be	  expanded	  
include	  reflections	  on	  ‘the	  size	  and	  sustainability	  of	  capital	  flows’,	  and	  also	  to	  report	  on	  the	  ‘deficiencies	  in	  
data	  quality	  and	  /	  or	   lack	  of	  timely	  reporting’.iii	  And	  while	  staffs	  at	  this	  time	  were	  encouraged	  to	  adopt	  a	  
proactive	  approach	  to	  identifying	  domestic	  impediments	  to	  effective	  data	  collection	  (Boughton	  2012:	  115),	  
it	  was	  with	  the	  Asian	  Financial	  Crisis	   that	  more	  comprehensive	   institutional	  reforms	  occurred.	   In	  summer	  
1997,	  as	  the	  global	   impact	  of	  the	  crisis	  was	  continuing	  to	  unfold,	  the	  Executive	  Board	  began	  to	  reflect	  on	  
the	   potential	  mechanisms	   through	  which	   greater	   openness	   and	   accountability	   in	   economic	   policymaking	  
could	  help	  prevent	  the	  recurrence	  of	  a	  similar	  event	  (Boughton	  2012:	  126-­‐7).	  Towards	  this	  end,	  through	  the	  
late	  1990s	  the	  Fund	  established	  a	  series	  of	  standards	  and	  codes	  on	  data	  collection	  and	  sharing.	  Amongst	  
the	   plethora	   of	   schemes	   that	   were	   rolled	   out	   during	   this	   time,	   the	   Special	   Data	   Dissemination	   System	  
(SDDS),	   General	   Data	   Dissemination	   System	   (GDDS),	   Financial	   Soundness	   Indicators	   initiative	   (FSI),	   and	  
Coordinated	  Portfolio	  Investment	  Survey	  (CPIS)	  require	  particular	  mention.	  	  
	   The	  SDDS	  and	  GDDS	  were	   launched	   in	  1996	  and	  1997	   respectively,	  with	  both	   schemes	  aiming	   to	  
provide	   useable	   templates	   to	   guide	   members	   through	   the	   process	   of	   collating	   and	   publishing	   core	  
macroeconomic	  and	  financial	  data.	  The	  SDDS	  was	  conceived	  for	  members	  that	  either	  had	  or	  were	  seeking	  
to	  gain	  access	  to	  international	  financial	  markets,	  and	  by	  signing-­‐up	  member	  states	  committed	  to	  providing	  
21	   data	   categories	   covering	   the	   real,	   fiscal,	   financial,	   and	   external	   sectors.	   Significantly,	   within	   its	  
framework	   the	   SDDS	   required	   that	   data	   on	   holdings	   of	   foreign	   reserves	   be	   made	   public,	   marking	   a	  
significant	  break	  with	  past	  practices	  in	  relation	  to	  this	  information	  (IMF	  2008:	  22-­‐5).	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  
that,	  by	  facilitating	  the	  flow	  of	  data	  to	  market	  actors	  and	  enhancing	  signatories’	  reputation	  as	  a	  responsible	  
financial	  actor,	  participation	  in	  SDDS	  provides	  a	  discount	  of	  around	  50	  basis	  points	  on	  primary	  bond	  issues	  
(Cady	  2005).	  Following	  the	  initial	  success	  of	  the	  SDDS,	  a	  parallel	  scheme	  was	  introduced	  for	  lower-­‐income	  
members	  of	  the	   IMF.	  The	  main	  focus	  of	  the	  GDDS	  was	  on	  supporting	  the	  development	  of	  data-­‐collection	  
capabilities;	   whereas	   membership	   of	   SDDS	   entails	   dissemination	   commitments,	   the	   GDDS	   requires	   only	  
that	   signatories	   publicise	   information	   on	   existing	   data-­‐collection	   practices	   and	   identify	   areas	   of	   need	   to	  
which	   the	   IMF	   (and	   other	   international	   organisations)	   can	   provide	   technical	   assistance	   (IMF	   2008:	   55).	  
Currently,	  around	  95	  percent	  of	  IMF	  members	  are	  signed	  up	  to	  the	  GDDS	  and	  SDDS.iv	  
	   Alongside	   the	  GDDS	   and	   SDDS,	   the	  Asian	   Financial	   Crisis	   served	   to	   catalyse	   developments	   in	   the	  
Fund’s	  efforts	   to	   identify	  and	  promote	  a	  range	  of	  Financial	  Soundness	   Indicators.	  Through	  the	   late	  1990s	  
IMF	   staff,	   in	   consultation	   with	   national	   regulatory	   agencies,	   began	   to	   explore	   methods	   of	   capturing	  
systemic	   risks	   to	   members’	   financial	   sectors	   through	   the	   use	   of	   what	   were	   termed	   Macroprudential	  
Indicators.	  Following	  a	  Board	  review	  in	  2001	  the	  FSI	  moniker	  was	  adopted,	  and	  by	  2004	  64	  advanced-­‐	  and	  
emerging-­‐market	  economies	  had	  opted	  in	  to	  the	  multilateral	  effort	  to	  measure	  the	  ‘current	  financial	  health	  
and	   soundness	   of	   the	   entire	   sector	   of	   financial	   institutions	   in	   a	   country,	   and	   of	   the	   corporate	   and	  
household	  sectors	  that	  are	  the	  financial	  institutions’	  clients’	  (IMF	  2006:	  i).	  The	  project	  was	  formalised	  with	  
the	   launch	  of	  a	  Compilation	  Guide	  for	  Financial	  Soundness	   Indicators	   in	  2004;	   in	  total,	  some	  40	   individual	  
FSIs	  were	   included	   in	   the	  Fund’s	  Compilation	  Guide,	   divided	   into	  12	   ‘core’	   and	  28	   ‘encouraged’	   FSIs	   (see	  
Table	   1).	   Core	   Indicators	   all	   relate	   to	   deposit-­‐taking	   financial	   institutions,	   and	   the	   encouraged	   Indicators	  
relate	   to	   deposit	   takers,	   other	   financial	   corporations,	   non-­‐financial	   corporations,	   households,	   the	   real	  
estate	  market,	  and	  financial	  market	  conditions	  (IMF	  2007b:	  1-­‐9).	  The	  launch	  of	  the	  Compilation	  Guide	  was	  
accompanied	   by	   an	   attempt	   to	   gather	   FSIs	   from	   the	   64	   participating	   member	   states,	   through	   the	  
Coordinated	   Compilation	   Exercise	   (CCE)	   (IMF	   2007a:	   6-­‐12).	   While	   universal	   reporting	   on	   core	   data	   was	  
achieved,	  data	  collection	  on	  measures	  relating	  to	  non-­‐bank	  financial	  corporations,	  households,	  and	  market	  
liquidity	  was	  more	   variable	   (see	   Figure	   1).	   At	   the	   time	   that	   the	   global	   ‘credit	   crunch’	   began	   to	   emerge,	  
discussions	   were	   ongoing	   as	   to	   how	   best	   to	   embed	   the	   FSI	   process	   into	   international	   and	   national	  
regulatory	  practices.	  	  
	  
Table	  1	  and	  Figure	  1	  here	  
	  
Beyond	  the	  FSIs,	  after	  the	  Asian	  Financial	  Crisis	  the	  IMF	  Board	  established	  a	  Task	  Force	  to	  improve	  
the	  functioning	  of	  its	  Coordinated	  Portfolio	  Investment	  Survey.	  By	  taking	  a	  comprehensive	  audit	  of	  holdings	  
of	  cross-­‐border	  equities	  and	  long-­‐	  and	  short-­‐term	  debt	  holdings,	  and	  recording	  the	  country	  of	  residence	  of	  
the	  issuer,	  the	  scheme	  was	  intended	  to	  bring	  precision	  to	  the	  Fund’s	  measurement	  of	  global	  capital	  flows.	  
The	  results	  of	  the	  first	  CPIS	  were	  published	  in	  1999,	  and	  from	  2001	  IMF	  staff	  have	  conducted	  the	  Survey	  on	  
an	  annual	  basis	  (IMF	  2002:	  1-­‐3).	  With	  its	  insights	  forming	  a	  core	  input	  into	  the	  IMF	  Global	  Financial	  Stability	  
Report	   (the	   first	   of	   which	   was	   published	   in	   2002),	   CPIS	   rapidly	   became	   a	   high-­‐profile	   tool	   in	   the	  
organisation’s	   monitoring	   arsenal.	   As	   member	   states	   moved	   to	   integrate	   the	   Survey	   into	   national	  
regulatory	   cycles,	   the	  number	  of	   participating	  members	   rose	   from	   just	   29	   in	   the	   initial	   1999	   iteration	   to	  
over	  70	  by	  the	  late	  2000s	  (IMF	  2010:	  1-­‐2).	  	  
Though	  operating	  on	  a	  voluntary	  basis,	  by	  2007	  significant	  advancements	  had	  been	  made	  by	   the	  
IMF	  in	  relation	  to	  its	  data-­‐collection	  activities.	  With	  the	  SDDS,	  FSI,	  and	  CPIS	  the	  organisation	  had	  begun	  to	  
consolidate	   its	   efforts	   to	   establish	   and	   disseminate	   ‘best	   practice’	  models	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   collation	   of	  
macroeconomic	   and	   in	   particular	   financial	   sector	   data.	   In	   executing	   this	   role	   of	   data-­‐collection	   hub,	   IMF	  
support	   was	   designed	   to	   ameliorate	   problems	   associated	   with	   weak	   national	   capacity	   and	   the	   non-­‐
comparability	  of	  different	  national	  templates,	  and	  more	  broadly	  to	  establish	  the	  idea	  that	  transparency	  in	  
economic	  data	  was	  of	  benefit	  to	  state	  actors.	  And	  in	  tandem	  with	  this	  evolutionary	  adaptation	  of	  existing	  
data-­‐collection	  practices,	  efforts	  were	  also	  made	  to	  enhance	  the	  Fund’s	  institutional	  understanding	  of	  the	  
changing	  role	  of	  financial	  sectors	  in	  many	  member	  states.	  Throughout	  the	  late	  1990s,	  senior	  management	  
at	   the	   Fund	   had	   remained	   aware	   that	   successfully	   securing	   this	   broadened	   focus	   was	   contingent	   on	  
enhancing	  the	  organisation’s	  analytic	  capacity	  in	  relation	  to	  financial	  sector	  management	  and	  the	  domestic	  
and	  international	  implications	  of	  financial	  sector	  developments	  (IMF	  1997;	  1998;	  1999).	  The	  Monetary	  and	  
Exchange	  Affairs	   Department	   initially	   provided	   the	   institutional	   location	  within	  which	   these	   efforts	  were	  
centred,	   and	   gained	   an	   important	   ally	   in	   2001	   with	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   International	   Capital	   Market	  
Department	  (ICMD)	  (IMF	  2001).	  From	  its	  inception	  the	  ICMD	  held	  primary	  responsibility	  for	  the	  production	  
of	   the	   Global	   Financial	   Stability	   Report,	   and	   was	   the	   lead	   Department	   on	   CPIS.	   The	   Fund’s	   expanding	  
financial-­‐sector	   expertise	   was	   given	   a	   positive	   assessment	   in	   a	   2006	   internal	   review,	   albeit	   with	   the	  
important	  caveat	  that	  ‘limited	  inroads	  [have	  been	  made]	  to	  identifying	  and	  highlighting	  potential	  spillover	  
channels	   and	   effects’	   in	   contexts	   with	   extensive	   cross-­‐border	   financial	   flows	   (IEO	   2006:	   9).v	   Despite	   the	  
more	   expansive	   data	   flows,	   analytic	   capacity	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   transmission	   of	   financial	   shocks	   across	  
borders	   remained	  under-­‐developed.	  As	   is	   demonstrated	  below,	   this	   important	   shortcoming	   continues	   to	  
limit	  the	  organisation’s	  post-­‐GFC	  Data	  Gaps	  Initiative.	  	  
	  
4.	  The	  IMF-­‐FSB	  Data	  Gaps	  Initiative:	  A	  Job	  Half-­‐Done	  
Following	   a	   call	   in	   2008	   by	   the	   G20	   Finance	  Ministers	   for	   the	   IMF	   and	   the	   Financial	   Stability	   Board	   ‘to	  
explore	  gaps	  and	  provide	  appropriate	  proposals	  for	  strengthening	  data	  collection’	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  Global	  
Financial	  Crisis,vi	  the	  organisations	  rapidly	  issued	  a	  joint	  report	  identifying	  the	  main	  financial	  and	  economic	  
information	  gaps	  (IMF	  and	  FSB	  2009).	  The	  Data	  Gaps	  Initiative	  highlighted	  shortcomings	  in	  relation	  to	  risks	  
in	  the	  financial	  sector,	  cross-­‐border	  financial	  exposures,	  vulnerabilities	  of	  domestic	  economies	  to	  financial	  
shock,	  and	  communication	  among	  supervisors.	  	  
The	   proposals	   within	   the	   resulting	   Data	   Gaps	   Initiative	   fall	   broadly	   into	   two	   groups:	   on	   the	   one	  
hand	  are	  proposals	  that	  aim	  to	  make	  modest	  conversions	  to	  existing	  data-­‐collection	  practices,	  and	  on	  the	  
other	  are	  proposals	  that	  aim	  to	  layer	  in	  new	  practices.	  When	  reviewing	  the	  achievements	  regarding	  each	  of	  
these	  areas	  in	  turn,	  we	  also	  reflect	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  institutional	  learning	  has	  occurred	  in	  relation	  to	  
the	   domestic	   and	   international	   spillover-­‐effects	   of	   financial	   sector	   disruptions.	   In	   view	  of	   the	   short	   time	  
lapse	   since	   the	   launch	   of	   the	   Data	   Gaps	   Initiative,	   our	   assessment	   that	   the	   job	   remains	   ‘half	   done’	  
represents	  an	  evaluation	  of	  a	  work	  in	  progress.	  	  	  
The	   first	   group	   of	   proposals	   that	   were	   raised	   by	   the	   Data	   Gaps	   Initiative	   tied	   closely	   in	   to	   pre-­‐
existing	   reform	   efforts,	   and	   relate	   in	   the	  main	   to	   efforts	   to	   enhance	   the	   production	   and	   publication	   of	  
Financial	  Stability	   Indicators	  and	  Coordinated	  Portfolio	   Investment	  Survey	  data.	  With	  a	  history	  going	  back	  
to	  the	  Asian	  Financial	  Crisis,	  the	  FSIs	  were	  at	  an	  important	  juncture	  at	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  GFC.	  Having	  recently	  
completed	  the	  Coordinated	  Collection	  Exercise	  and	  gathered	  a	  range	  of	  core	  and	  encouraged	  data	  from	  the	  
64	  signatory	  members,	  the	  Executive	  Board	  was	  in	  early	  2007	  exploring	  mechanisms	  for	  further	  integrating	  
the	   FSIs	   into	   its	   operational	   activities.	   Following	   the	   DGI	   review,	   efforts	   to	  mainstream	   these	   Indicators	  
have	   been	   stepped	   up.	  With	   staff	   and	   senior	  management’s	   promotion	   of	   the	   Indicators,	   an	   increasing	  
number	  of	  states	  are	  regularly	  collecting	  and	  releasing	  both	  core	  and	  encouraged	  data.	  Through	  the	  course	  
of	  2011	  an	  additional	  three	  of	  the	  G20	  member	  states	  began	  reporting	  Financial	  Stability	   Indicators,	  such	  
that	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year	  a	  total	  of	  18	  were	  engaged	  with	  the	  initiative	  (IMF	  and	  FSB	  2011:	  6).	  In	  addition,	  
the	  IMF	  has	  begun	  to	  employ	  its	  own	  communication	  mechanisms	  in	  order	  to	  further	  enhance	  the	  profile	  of	  
the	  FSIs;	  in	  July	  2009	  an	  online	  Financial	  Stability	  Indicator	  database	  was	  launch	  by	  the	  Fund,	  and	  as	  of	  April	  
2011	  core	   Indicators	  are	  now	   integrated	   into	  the	  organisation’s	  biannual	  Global	  Financial	  Stability	  Report	  
(IMF	  and	  FSB	  2010:	  20;	  IMF	  and	  FSB	  2011:	  6-­‐7).	  	  
Beyond	   these	   profile-­‐raising	   activities,	   progress	   in	   extending	   domestic	   authorities’	   reporting	   of	  
Financial	  Soundness	  Indicators	  has	  been	  relatively	  modest.	  Core	  indicators	  relating	  to	  the	  performance	  of	  
recognised	  deposit-­‐taking	  banks	  have	  been	  widely	  collated	  and	  disseminated,	  perhaps	  reflecting	  the	  well-­‐
existing	   domestic	   channels	   of	   communication	   between	   national	   regulators	   and	   such	   entities.	   However,	  
reporting	   on	   non-­‐core	   indicators	   remains	   less	   comprehensive.	   Amongst	   G20	   states,	   only	   five	   have	  
submitted	  data	  for	  the	  2006-­‐12	  period	  on	  the	  assets	  of	  non-­‐bank	  financial	  corporations	  (Indicator	  26),	  four	  
on	  household	  debt	  service	  to	  income	  ratios	  and	  the	  average	  daily	  turnover	  of	  securities	  markets	  (Indicators	  
34	   and	   36),	   and	   three	   on	   household	   debt	   to	   GDP	   (Indicator	   33).vii	   In	   general	   terms	   the	   areas	   with	   low	  
reporting	   rates	   follow	   the	   pattern	   revealed	   by	   the	   Coordinated	   Collection	   Exercise,	   and	   in	   an	   effort	   to	  
address	   this	   shortcoming	   moves	   are	   underway	   to	   more	   completely	   integrate	   the	   Financial	   Stability	  
Indicators	  into	  the	  Special	  Data	  Dissemination	  System.	  	  
With	  the	  SDDS	  protocol	  having	  been	  designed	  for	  countries	  on	  the	  cusp	  of	  private	  market	  access,	  
the	  Data	  Gaps	   Initiative	   raised	   the	   suggestion	  of	   creating	   a	  new	   tier	   that	  was	   customised	   for	   economies	  
with	   particularly	   significant	   financial	   sectors.	   The	   SDDS-­‐Plus	   was	   launched	   in	   2012,	   with	   signatories	  
committing	  to	  the	  full	  observation	  of	  a	  range	  of	  data	  categories	  –	   including	  the	  FSIs	  –	  by	  December	  2019	  
(IMF	  2012b).	  The	  consolidation	  of	   the	  Fund’s	  expansion	  of	   its	  data-­‐collection	  network	   to	  cover	  non-­‐bank	  
financial	  entities,	  non-­‐financial	  corporations,	  and	  households	  will,	  it	  seems,	  require	  time.	  Unfortunately,	  it	  
was	  suggested	  at	  a	   recent	   ‘user	  conference’	  on	   the	  FSIs	   that	   these	  areas	  where	  data	  coverage	  was	  at	   its	  
weakest	  were	  precisely	  the	  sectors	  to	  which	  risk	  had	  been	  transferred	  by	  responses	  to	  the	  Global	  Financial	  
Crisis	  (Braasch	  2009).	  In	  addition,	  at	  the	  same	  event	  critical	  reflections	  were	  aired	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  analytic	  
framework	   that	   overlaid	   the	   FSIs.	   First,	   it	   was	   suggested	   that	   the	   annualised	   data-­‐collection	   processes	  
remained	  too	  infrequent	  –	  even	  if	  functioning	  perfectly	  –	  to	  usefully	  shed	  light	  on	  rapidly	  developing	  crises.	  
Second,	  and	  perhaps	  most	  significantly,	  at	   the	  conference	  findings	  were	  reported	  from	  post	  hoc	  analyses	  
that	   suggested	   the	   FSI	   dataset	   provided	   little	   assistance	   in	   understanding	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   Global	  
Financial	   Crisis	   (Braasch	   2009;	   Enoch	   2009).	   As	   such,	   in	   addition	   to	   its	   technocratic	   shortcomings,	   the	  
intellectual	  underpinnings	  of	  the	  Financial	  Soundness	  Indicators	  were	  also	  brought	  into	  question.	  
	   In	   contrast	   to	   the	   range	   of	   issues	   surrounding	   the	   FSIs,	   the	   Fund’s	   efforts	   to	   enhance	   the	  
Coordinated	   Portfolio	   Investment	   Survey	   have	   been	   relatively	   smooth.	   Alongside	   the	   FSIs,	   CPIS	   reforms	  
represent	  an	  additional	  attempt	  to	  make	  modest	  conversions	  to	  pre-­‐existing	  schemes.	  However,	  given	  the	  
existing	  successes	  of	  the	  Survey,	  reforms	  planned	  under	  the	  Data	  Gaps	  Initiative	  have	  been	  minor.	  As	  CPIS	  
was	   by	   the	   onset	   of	   the	   Global	   Financial	   Crisis	   already	   generating	   comprehensive	   data	   on	   holdings	   of	  
foreign	   investments	   by	   resident	   entities	   in	   over	   70	   advanced-­‐	   and	   emerging-­‐market	   economies,	   through	  
the	  DGI	   the	  main	  proposal	  was	   to	  double	   the	  periodicity	  of	  data	  collection	   from	  an	  annual	   to	  a	  biannual	  
basis	  (IMF	  and	  FSB	  2010:	  6).	  The	  Data	  generated	  by	  the	  Survey	  continues	  to	  be	  used	  in	  analyses	  of	  global	  
financial	   linkages	  by	  both	  practitioners	  and	  academic	  observers	   (e.g.	   IMF	  2012a;	  Milesi-­‐Ferretti	   and	  Lane	  
2010	  ;	  Song	  et	  al	  2009).viii	  	  
	   Moving	  on	   to	   efforts	   instigated	   through	   the	  Data	  Gaps	   Initiative	   that	   require	   the	   introduction	  of	  
new	   lines	  of	  data-­‐collection	  activities	   into	  global	   financial	  governance,	   the	  core	   tasks	  have	   related	   to	   the	  
identification	  of	  systemically	  important	  economies,	  Systemically	  Important	  Financial	  Institutions	  (SIFIs),	  and	  
Global	  Systemically	  Important	  Financial	  Institutions	  (G-­‐SIFIs).	  The	  IMF	  has	  played	  a	  lead	  role	  in	  the	  former	  
task,	   and	   a	   relatively	   minor	   role	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   latter	   tasks.	   In	   terms	   of	   systemically	   important	  
economies,	   the	   G20	   has	   become	   the	   core	   unit	   of	   analysis	   for	   post-­‐Crisis	   reforms.	   Working	   with	   the	  
European	   Central	   Bank,	   Organisation	   for	   Economic	   Cooperation	   and	   Development,	   United	   Nations,	   and	  
World	  Bank,	  the	  IMF	  has	   led	  efforts	  to	  construct	  a	  Principal	  Global	   Indicators	  (PGI)	  dataset.	  By	  combining	  
the	   data-­‐collection	   networks	   in	   and	   around	   these	   agencies,	   the	   PGI	   presents	   internationally-­‐comparable	  
statistics	   from	   the	   G20	   members	   (plus	   five	   additional	   systemically	   important	   economies)	   on	   the	   real	  
economy,	   portfolio	   investment	   positions	   (from	   CPIS),	   domestic	   credit,	   and	   consumer	   and	   business	  
confidence.	   In	  addition,	  through	  its	  Mutual	  Assessment	  Process,	   IMF	  staff	   in	  2009	  delivered	  Sustainability	  
Report	   on	   the	   seven	  members	   of	   the	   G20	   whose	   external	   imbalances	   were	   thought	   to	   have	   significant	  
implications	   for	   global	   stability	   (IMF	   2011b).	   The	   similarity	   of	   these	   new	   responsibilities	   to	   the	   Fund’s	  
‘traditional’	   bilateral	   surveillance	   activities	   help	   explain	   the	   relatively	   swift	   progress	   in	   this	   regard.	   And	  
whereas	   the	  Fund	  has	   led	   in	   identifying	  and	  collating	  data	  on	  systemically	   important	  economies,	  on	  SIFIs	  
and	  G-­‐SIFIs	  the	  organisation	  has	  played	  a	  decidedly	  more	  supporting	  role.	  
	   As	  with	  the	  Principal	  Global	  Indicators,	  the	  IMF	  is	  currently	  working	  in	  concert	  with	  a	  range	  of	  other	  
agencies	   to	   identify	   and	   manage	   the	   risks	   associated	   with	   (Global)	   Systemically	   Important	   Financial	  
Institutions.	  In	  these	  efforts,	  while	  the	  Fund	  has	  served	  as	  an	  important	  consultative	  partner,	  the	  Bank	  for	  
International	  Settlements	  and	   the	  Financial	  Stability	  Board	  have	  served	  as	   the	   lead	  agencies.	   In	  2011	   the	  
FSB	   released	   its	   initial	   list	   of	   29	   G-­‐SIFIs;	   these	   institutions	   are	   required	   to	   hold	   higher	   levels	   of	   reserve	  
capital,	   with	   the	   magnitude	   of	   this	   surplus	   levied	   according	   to	   the	   potential	   disruptiveness	   of	   the	  
institution’s	  failure	  (FSB	  2012b;	  2011b).	   In	  addition,	  the	  Board	  has	  released	  a	  ‘best	  practice’	  guide	  for	  the	  
orderly	   resolution	   of	   a	   SIFI	   collapse.	   By	   so	   doing,	   a	   series	   of	   legal	   and	   regulatory	   pre-­‐requisites	   are	  
highlighted	   for	   national	   authorities	   to	  move	   toward	   the	   establishment	   of	   (FSB	   2011a).	   These	   impressive	  
BIS-­‐	  and	  FSB-­‐led	  efforts	  intersect	  with	  IMF	  data	  collection	  operations	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  bilateral	  surveillance.	  
In	  particular,	  the	  Fund’s	  regular	  Financial	  Sector	  Assessment	  Programmes	  will	  be	  used	  to	  keep	  track	  of	  the	  
extent	  to	  which	  members	  are	  meeting	  the	  obligations	  laid	  out	  in	  the	  FSB-­‐endorsed	  framework	  documents.	  
It	  is	  through	  monitoring	  and	  disseminating	  information	  on	  compliance	  that	  the	  IMF	  will	  support	  efforts	  to	  
contain	  the	  risks	  posed	  by	  SIFIs	  and	  G-­‐SIFIs.	  
	   The	   Global	   Financial	   Crisis	   served	   to	   emphatically	   demonstrate	   that	   the	   contemporary	   global	  
economy	   is	   formed	  of	   complex	  networks	  of	   interdependence,	   through	  which	   shocks	   can	  be	  dramatically	  
magnified	  through	  their	  transmittal	  across	  sectors	  and	  across	  borders.	  The	  reforms	  initiated	  under	  the	  Data	  
Gaps	   Initiative	  have	  been	  designed	  so	  as	   to	  enhance	  policymakers’	  ability	   to	  keep	  tabs	  on	  these	  evolving	  
linkages.	  From	  the	  efforts	  to	  expand	  the	  coverage	  of	  the	  Financial	  Soundness	  Indicators	  into	  the	  realms	  of	  
non-­‐bank	  financial	  entities,	  firms,	  and	  households,	  to	  the	  minor	  enhancements	  of	  the	  Coordinated	  Portfolio	  
Investment	   Survey,	   to	   the	   efforts	   to	   enact	   intensive	   surveillance	   over	   systemically	   important	   economies	  
and	   financial	   institutions,	   the	   IMF’s	   latest	   data	   rush	   has	   been	   an	   extensive	   enterprise.	   However,	   as	  was	  
hinted	   at	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   FSI	   reviews	   noted	   above,	   significant	   questions	   remain	   over	   the	   Fund’s	  
institutional	  capacity	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  these	  global	  financial	  linkages.	  
	   Through	  2006-­‐07,	  weaknesses	  in	  the	  Fund’s	  understanding	  of	  macro-­‐financial	  linkages	  contributed	  
to	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  organisation	  to	  provide	  robust	  early	  warning	  of	  the	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis	  (IEO	  2011b).	  
In	   part,	   through	   the	   pre-­‐GFC	   years	   the	   weaknesses	   in	   the	   International	   Monetary	   Fund	   reflected	   the	  
dominant	  patterns	  in	  the	  field	  of	  Macroeconomics	  that	  defines	  the	  organisation’s	  professional	  culture.	  As	  is	  
noted	  in	  a	  recent,	  and	  admirably	  candid,	  internal	  review:	  
For	   years,	   economists	   were	   trained	   in	   models	   without	   money	   or	   a	   financial	   sector…	   Recent	  
economics	  graduates	  would	  be	  familiar	  with	  the	  ‘financial	  accelerator’	  approach	  in	  which	  financial	  
market	  conditions	  can	  greatly	  amplify	  initial	  shocks…	  but	  those	  models	  were	  out	  of	  favour	  with	  the	  
efficient-­‐markets	  thinking	  that	  dominated	  the	  profession	  (IEO	  2011a:	  4)	  
	  
In	   the	   years	   since,	   however,	   there	   is	   little	   evidence	   of	   a	   significant	   intellectual	   shift	   having	   taken	   place.	  
Across	  the	  institution,	  around	  10	  percent	  of	  the	  IMF’s	  operational	  budget	  is	  dedicated	  to	  the	  production	  of	  
research	   outputs.	   A	   large	   majority	   of	   this	   output	   continues	   to	   be	   produced	   by	   the	   Fund’s	   Area	  
Departments,	   and	   to	   take	   a	   policy-­‐orientated	   approach	   (IEO	   2011c).	   From	   2005-­‐08,	   approximately	   two	  
percent	   of	   the	   organisation’s	   research	   output	   was	   directed	   toward	   exploring	   the	   domestic	   and	  
international	   spillover	  effects	  of	   financial	   sector	  disruptions.	  Moreover,	   the	  operational	  utilisation	  of	   this	  
research	  activity	  remained	  ‘difficult	  to	  discern’	  (IEO	  2011a:	  ii,	  5).	  	  
Attempts	  have	  been	  made	  recently	  to	  outline	  areas	  for	  future	  IMF	  research	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  links	  
between	  finance	  and	  the	  real	  economy.	  Senior	  management	  and	  Executive	  Directors	  have	  made	  calls	   for	  
both	   a	   greater	   focus	   on	   macro-­‐financial	   linkages,	   and	   a	   more	   effective	   utilisation	   of	   research	   in	   IMF	  
operations	  (IEO	  2011c:	   	  41-­‐5).	   In	  addition,	  current	  work	  programmes	  in	  the	  Research	  Department	  include	  
projects	   exploring	   the	   links	   between	   financial	   structures	   and	   financial	   stability,	   the	   drivers	   of	   real	   estate	  
cycles,	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  regulation	  on	  financial	  intermediation	  (IEO	  2011a:	  14-­‐15).	  However,	  as	  is	  noted	  by	  
the	  recent	  Triennial	  Surveillance	  Review	  (IMF	  2011a),	  substantial	  work	  is	  still	  needed	  to	  improve	  the	  Fund’s	  
understanding	   of	  macro-­‐financial	   interconnections,	   financial	   risk	   and	   the	   sources	   of	   external	   imbalances	  
beyond	  exchange	  rate	  policies.	  
The	  Data	  Gaps	  Initiative	  of	  2009	  closely	  paralleled	  earlier	  post-­‐crisis	  data	  rushes	  at	  the	  IMF.	  Indeed,	  
major	  aspects	  of	  the	  DGI	  hooked	  directly	  in	  to	  reform	  efforts	  that	  had	  been	  catalysed	  through	  the	  1990s	  by	  
the	  1994	  Mexican	  Crisis	  and	  1997-­‐8	  Asian	  Financial	  Crisis.	  With	  core	  Financial	  Soundness	  Indicators	  having	  
been	   integrated	   into	   reporting	   processes,	   steps	   in	   place	   to	   extend	   the	   collation	   and	   publication	   of	   FSIs	  
covering	   non-­‐bank	   entities,	   firms,	   and	   households,	   and	   a	   strengthening	   of	   the	   Coordinated	   Portfolio	  
Investment	  Survey	  having	  been	  implemented,	  the	  organisation’s	  activities	  as	  a	  data-­‐collection	  hub	  are	  set	  
to	   continue	   to	  expand	  over	   the	  medium	   term.	  With	   the	  Fund	  also	  exercising	  enhanced	   surveillance	  over	  
systemically	  important	  economies	  and	  reviewing	  the	  extent	  of	  member	  states’	  compliance	  with	  regulatory	  
guidelines	   issued	   by	   the	   Bank	   for	   International	   Settlements	   and	   the	   Financial	   Stability	   Board,	   the	  
organisation’s	  place	  at	  the	  summit	  of	  global	  data-­‐collection	  processes	  appears	  to	  be	  securely	  set.	  However,	  
in	   spite	  of	   these	   achievements,	  major	   questions	   remain	  over	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	   IMF	   to	   ‘make	   sense’	   of	  
these	  ever-­‐greater	  flows	  of	  data.	  	  
	  
Conclusions	  
Data	  collection	  has	  been	  identified	  by	  IO	  scholars	  as	  an	  activity	  in	  which	  multilateral	  arenas	  hold	  significant	  
sources	  of	   comparative	   advantage.	  With	   their	  well-­‐established	   channels	   of	   communication	  with	   relevant	  
national	  authorities,	  IO	  staff	  are	  able	  establish	  global	  templates	  according	  to	  which	  readily	  comparable	  data	  
can	   be	   collated.	   Through	   such	   processes,	   international	   organisations	   can	   function	   as	   effective	   data-­‐
collection	   hubs,	   assisting	   in	   the	   development	   of	   domestic	   actors’	   capacity	   to	   generate	   and	   disseminate	  
information	   sets,	   and	   helping	   to	   embed	   an	   understanding	   of	   transparency	   in	   policymaking	   processes	   as	  
being	   a	   public	   good.	   Since	   the	   1980s,	   the	   International	  Monetary	   Fund	  has	  worked	   to	  proactively	   shape	  
member	   states’	   data	   gathering	   activities,	   establishing	   templates	   through	   the	   latter	   decades	   of	   the	  
twentieth	   century	   for	   the	   collection	   of	   information	   on	   government	   finances,	  macroeconomic	   indicators,	  
and	  real	  external	  linkages.	  Driven	  by	  events	  of	  the	  1990s	  and	  the	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis,	  recent	  data	  rushes	  
have	  seen	  the	  Fund	  increasing	  moving	  to	  both	  track	  the	  linkages	  between	  national	  financial	  markets,	  and	  
between	  financial	  sectors	  and	  real	  economic	  activities.	  While	  the	  IMF	  response	  to	  the	  Data	  Gaps	  Initiative	  
remains	   a	   job	   half	   done,	   the	   transnational	   data-­‐collection	   networks	   flowing	   around	   the	   IMF	   continue	   to	  
grow	  in	  complexity.	  	  
With	  their	  hard-­‐wired	  preference	  for	  adaptation	  over	  learning,	  international	  organisations	  have	  an	  
established	  tendency	  to	  respond	  to	  crisis	  events	  by	  making	  minor	  modifications	  to	  established	  projects,	  and	  
layering	  new	  tasks	  in	  to	  pre-­‐existing	  programmes.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  global	  financial	  surveillance,	  this	  proclivity	  
has	  been	  joined	  by	  an	  intellectual	  worldview	  in	  which	  the	  provision	  of	  greater	  flows	  of	  information	  came	  to	  
be	  seen	  as	  a	  primary	  means	  through	  which	  stability	  could	  be	  achieved.	  In	  common	  with	  earlier	  data	  rushes,	  
the	  Data	  Gaps	  Initiative	  reflects	  this	  core	  assumption	  that	  the	  ‘indeterminacies’	  in	  global	  financial	  markets	  
can	  be	  successfully	  managed	  through	  a	  ‘technical	  fix’.	  Given	  the	  remaining	  analytic	  weaknesses	  in	  relation	  
to	   the	   links	   between	   financial	   sector	   and	   the	   real	   economy,	   the	   intellectual	   infrastructure	   needed	   to	  
underpin	  deep	  processes	  of	  learning	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  effectively	  established.	  	  
Contemporary	  networks	  of	  financial	   interdependence	  are	  undoubtedly	  complex,	  and	  undoubtedly	  
entail	   extensive	   transnational	   interconnections.	  However,	   in	   the	   incremental	  moves	   toward	   ever	   greater	  
complexity	  in	  data-­‐collection	  networks,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  global	  policymakers	  are	  in	  danger	  of	  ‘missing	  the	  
wood	   for	   the	   trees’	   in	   post-­‐crisis	   regulation.	   In	   a	   recent	   paper,	   Andrew	   Haldane,	   Executive	   Director	   of	  
Financial	  Stability	  at	  the	  Bank	  of	  England,	  provides	  evidence	  of	  this	  tension.	  For	  Haldane	  (2011),	  based	  on	  a	  
sample	   of	   100	   global	   banks,	   the	  most	   effective	   predictor	   of	   collapse	   remained	   a	   basic	   ratio	   of	   assets	   to	  
liabilities	   (FSI	   13;	   ironically,	   the	   first	   ‘non-­‐core’	   measure).	  While	   the	   IMF	   is	   working	   to	   support	   reforms	  
identified	  through	  the	  Data	  Gaps	  Initiative	  by	  enhancing	  efforts	  to	  track	  global	  financial	   flows	  and	  extend	  
the	   coverage	  of	   a	   range	  of	  new	  and	  pre-­‐existing	   indicators,	   it	   is	   important,	   too,	   that	   regulators	   focus	  on	  
implementing	   basic	   principles	   effectively;	   although	   a	   source	   of	   significant	   potential	   benefits,	   ever-­‐
increasing	   levels	   of	   sophistication	   in	   data-­‐collection	   networks	   will	   not	   automatically	   lead	   to	   the	   more	  
effective	   governance	   of	   global	   financial	   markets.	   While	   there	   is	   value	   in	   ensuring	   that	   data-­‐collection	  
infrastructure	  functions	  effectively,	  it	  is	  ultimately	  processes	  of	  interpretation	  that	  will	  make	  the	  difference.	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iv Authors’ analysis of the IMF’s Special Data Dissemination Bulletin and General Data Dissemination Bulletin. See 
IMF Official Website, available at http://dsbb.imf.org/pages/gdds/CountryList.aspx and 
http://dsbb.imf.org/Pages/SDDS/NSDPPages.aspx . Accessed 22/11/12. 
v For more information on these developments, see Morchella (2011). 
vi Techincally, as the FSB had not at that point been created, this initial G20 call was in fact issued to its predecessor the 
Financial Stability Forum. However, following its creation in 2009 the FSB took up this task alongside the IMF. 
vii Authors’ analysis of IMF e-Library Cross-Dataset. See IMF Official Website, available at http://elibrary-
data.imf.org/QueryBuilder.aspx?s=322&key=1445284&f=1&ts=1&ys=2002&ye=2011&ms=1&me=12&ds=1&de=31
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flows (BIS 2012). While this shift is not explicitly aligned with the Data Gaps Initiative, the development again 
illustrates the increasing layers of complexity being layered in to international financial sector surveillance efforts. 
